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Just as "discharge" may be characterized as the prime mover in
the filing of voluntary bankruptcy proceedings,' the trustee's
"avoiding powers" may be characterized as the prime mover in the
instituting of involuntary bankruptcy proceedings. The trustee's
avoiding powers are those given him to avoid and set aside transfers
made and obligations incurred 2 by a bankrupt or debtor3 which
violate the bankruptcy law's basic policy of effecting a fair and
equal distribution of the debtor's assets among his creditors. The
filing of the bankruptcy petition establishes a date of cleavage. After
that date, the debtor's ability to effectively transfer his assets is
*

A.B., LL.B., University of Notre Dame, Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas.

A.B., George Washington University, LL.B., Southern Methodist University, Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texqs.
1. Comment, Discharge: The Prime Mover of Bankruptcy, 15 Sw. L.J. 308, 308 (1961).
2. Whenever the avoiding power also extends to obligations incurred, this fact will be
noted at the beginning of the discussion of the avoiding power. For the sake of brevity, the
accompanying discussion will be in terms of transfers made.
3. The "bankrupt" under the Bankruptcy Act has been replaced by the "debtor" under
the Bankruptcy Reform Act. qompare Bankruptcy Act § 1(4) (repealed 1978, previously
codified as 11 U.S.C. § 1(4)) with 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(12) (West Supp. 1979).
**

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

1

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 11 [2022], No. 2, Art. 3

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 11:311

extremely curtailed. Certain transfers made and obligations incurred by the debtor within prescribed time limits prior to that date
may be avoided by the trustee and the property recovered or preserved for the benefit of all the creditors.
Many of the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act (the Act) have
worked well and are continued in the Bankruptcy Code (the Code)
in simplified form with little substantive change. Other provisions
of the Act have proven ineffective or counterproductive and have
been eliminated in the Code or substantially revised. In this article
the trustee's avoiding powers under the Code will be reviewed by
comparing them with the avoiding powers under the Act for two
basic reasons: (1) the provisions of the Act will continue to apply in
all bankruptcy cases filed prior to October 1, 1979,1 and (2) the
extent and significance of the changes made by the Code can best
be understood by such a comparison.
Many of the provisions of the Code are derived from a bankruptcy
bill proposed by the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the
United States (the Commission's bill)' and a bill proposed by the
National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges (the Judge's bill).'
Thus, the legislative history of these two bills is important in understanding the reasons for the changes which have been made in the
trustee's avoiding powers under the Code. Additionally, a substantial body of case law has developed construing and applying the
provisions of the Act, much of which will continue to be relevant in
applying the provisions of the Code. Although this article will discuss the avoiding powers as being those of the trustee, it must be
kept in mind that these powers may also be exercised by a debtorin-possession under both the Act 7 and the Code,8 and in some instances under the Code by the debtor himself.
I.

TRUSTEE AS A HYPOTHETICAL JUDICIAL LIEN CREDITOR

Under the Act
The "strong-arm clause" of section 70c gives the trustee the rights
4. See Bankruptcy Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 95-598, sec. 403(a), 92 Stat. 2683 (1978).
5. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R.
Doc. No. 137, Pt. II, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
6. H.R. REP. No. 32, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); S. REP. No. 235, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975).
7. See Bankruptcy Act § 342 (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. § 742).
8. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1107(a) (West Supp. 1979).

9. See id. § 522(h),(i).
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and powers of a hypothetical creditor who obtained, at the commencement of the bankruptcy proceedings: (1) a judgment against
the bankrupt, (2) an execution returned unsatisfied against the
bankrupt, and (3) a judicial lien on all property upon which a simple
contract creditor of the bankrupt could have obtained such a lien.' 0
A "savings clause" makes it clear that a transfer can be valid in part
and voidable in part against the trustee and a "chameleon clause"
provides that the trustee can maintain inconsistent positions with
reference to different parties, remedies or transactions."
Of the three capacities under the strong-arm clause, the trustee's
status as a judicial lien creditor is by far the most significant, affording for most purposes the greatest rights and powers that a creditor
can obtain. 12 Whenever such a creditor might prevail over prior
transfers, liens or encumbrances under applicable law, the trustee
will prevail and the subject property recovered or preserved for the
3
benefit of the bankruptcy estate.
The trustee's additional status as a holder of an execution returned unsatisfied insures that he will have all of the equitable
remedies and procedural rights available under applicable state law
only to such a creditor." In addition, this status may afford the
trustee a presumption that the judgment debtor is insolvent and
thereby materially assist him in avoiding transfers under applicable
state law. 5
The trustee's status as a "judgment creditor" was added by
amendment in 1966 to insure that the trustee fell within the cate10. See Bankruptcy Act § 70c (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. § 110(c)).
11. See S. REP. No. 1159, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess. 12 (1966); H.R. REP. No. 686, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1965); Kennedy, The Bankruptcy Amendments of 1966 41 REF. J. 53, 54
(1967). See generally Bankruptcy Act § 70c (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C.
§ 110(c)).
12. It is the status of "the ideal creditor, irreproachable and without notice, armed capa-pie with every right and power which is conferred by the law of the state upon its most
favored creditor who has acquired a lien by legal or equitable proceedings." In re Kravitz,
278 F.2d 820, 822 (3d Cir. 1960) (quoting In re Waynesboro Motor Co., 60 F.2d 668, 669 (S.D.
Miss. 1932)).

13. 4B

COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY

70.46, at 559-60 (14th ed. 1978).

14. Kennedy, The Bankruptcy Act Amendments of 1966, 41 REF. J. 53, 54 (1967). These
rights and remedies include discovery, injunction, receivership, levy on an equitable asset,
reformation, or cancellation of a writing. Professor Kennedy also notes that due to the decline
in the distinction between law and equity, the legislative liberalization of the rules governing
the availability of equitable relief and the formidable battery of weapons with which the
trustee in bankruptcy is armed, the availability of equitable relief under state law has become
moot.
15. See Bartlett v. Webber, 252 N.W. 892, 895 (Iowa 1934).
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gory of persons protected against an unfiled federal tax lien."
These strong-arm powers have proved to be necessary, important
tools in the trustee's efforts to secure all of the bankrupt's property
for an equal distribution according to the terms of the Act.
Under the Code
These avoiding powers are brought forward in sections 544(a)(1)
and (2) with little or no substantive change.'" The "savings clause,"
"chameleon clause" and the trustee's status as a "judgment creditor" were dropped as being surplusage." To avoid potential confusion or controversy, new language was included to make it clear
that: (1) the trustee's status is purely hypothetical and his rights are
in no way dependent on the existence of an actual creditor,'" (2) the
trustee's status is unaffected by any knowledge which he or any or
all creditors'may have," and (3) the hypothetical extension of credit
and the obtaining of the judicial lien both occur at the commencement of the case and not before."'
While these provisions of the Act and the Code vest the trustee
with the rights and remedies of a creditor with a judicial lien and
an execution returned unsatisfied, the extent of these powers are
16. See Kennedy, The Bankruptcy Act Amendments of 1966, 41 REF. J. 53, 54 (1967).
Contemporaneously, the Federal Tax Lien Act was amended by changing "judgment creditor" to "judgment lien creditor." Both amendments were unnecessary in light of the Supreme
Court's holding in United States v. Speers, that the trustee's greater status as a judicial
lienholder included the lesser status of a mere judgment holder. See United States v. Speers,
382 U.S. 266, 275 (1965); Countryman, The Use of State Law In Bankruptcy Cases (PartII),
47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 631, 649-50 (1972).
17. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 544(a)(1),(2) (West Supp. 1979). "Judicial Lien" is defined as
"lien obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or proceeding." Id. § 101(27).
18. See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R.
Doc. No. 137, Pt. I, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 200 (1973).
19. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 544(a)(1) (West Supp. 1979).
20. See id. § 544(a).
21. See 124 CONG. REC. H11089 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (statement of Hon. Don Edwards).
In particular, section 544(a)(1) overrules Pacific Finance Corp. v. Edwards, 309 F.2d
224 (9th Cir. 1962), and In re Federals, Inc., 553 F.2d 509 (6th Cir. 1977), insofar as
those cases held that the trustee did not have the status of a creditor who extended
credit immediately prior to the commencement of the case.
Id. at H11097 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978). But see Constance v. Harvey, 215 F.2d 571, 575 (2d
Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 913 (1955) (trustee entitled to assert lien of hypothetical
creditor who extended credit before filing of petition and before perfection of security transaction in issue). Constancewas later overruled by the Supreme Court. See Lewis v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 364 U.S. 603, 610 (1961).
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measured by the substantive law of the jurisdiction governing the
property in question. Neither the Code nor the Act confers on the
trustee rights any greater than those accorded such a creditor by
applicable state law.2 Therefore, in every situation where the trustee seeks to use his strong-arm powers to avoid a transfer made or
obligation incurred by the debtor, the following two issues are presented: (1) what state's law is applicable, and (2) under that law,
are the rights of such a judicial lien creditor superior to the rights
of the transferee or obligee? Inasmuch as the strong-arm provisions
of the Code are substantially similar to those of the Act, legislative
history and court decisions construing the provisions of the Act
continue to be relevant in answering these questions.
The first issue may prove difficult to determine if the state in
which the bankruptcy proceeding is pending differs from the state
where the transfer was made or the property is situated. While some
bankruptcy courts have applied the conflict of laws rules of the
forum state,' 3 others have held that they should be free to choose
which state law is to apply. 2 Most courts, however, have applied the
law of the situs of the property at the time of the commencement
of the bankruptcy proceedings. 21 Under the second issue, the following are examples of transfers and obligations which have been and
will continue to be avoided by the trustee: unperfected Uniform
Commercial Code security interests;2 1 consignments where the post22. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 544(b) (West Supp. 1979); Bankruptcy Act § 70c (repealed 1978,
previously codified as 11 U.S.C. 110(c)). See generally 4B COLLIER O14BANKRUPTCY 70.49,
at 602-04 (14th ed. 1978).
23. See United Constr. Co. v. Milam, 124 F.2d 670, 672 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S.
642 (1942).
24. See 1A MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.32211], at 3301 (2d ed. 1948, as revised 1979).
70.49, at 605-06 (14th ed. 1978).
25. 4B COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
26. See, e.g., In re Ronald A. Florio, 4 BANKR. CT. DEC. 647 (D. R.I. 1978); In re Forrest
Paschal Mach. Co., 3 BANKR. CT. DEC. 1227 (M.D. N.C. 1977); In re Butler's Tire & Battery
Co., 2 BANKR. CT. DEC. 496 (Ore. 1975). See generally 4B COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 70.51, at
617 (14th ed. 1978). Section 9-301 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides as follows:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2), an unperfected security
interest is subordinate to the rights of
(b) a person who becomes a lien creditor before the security interest is
perfected . ...
(2) If the secured party files with respect toa purchase money security interest
before or within ten days after the debtor receives possession of the collateral,
he takes priority over the rights of . . .a lien creditor which arise between the
time the security interest attaches and the time of filing.
U.C.C. § 9-301 (1972 version). Thus, a postpetition filing within the ten-day period would
insulate the transaction from the trustee's strong-arm attack. See generally notes 31-33, infra
and accompanying text.
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ing or filing requirements have not been met; 7 unrecorded real estate transfers and mortgages where the state recording act protects
subsequent judicial lien creditors;18 unfiled federal tax liens;2" and,
certain transfers fraudulent under state law.'"
If the transfer is perfected as against subsequent judicial lien
creditors at any time prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy
proceedings, the rights of the transferee will prevail over the rights
of the trustee under the strong-arm clause. Some state laws, and
in particular those relating to mechanics' and materialmen's liens
and purchase money security interests in equipment, provide that
where the required recordation is accomplished within a certain
length of time or period of grace, it will relate back to the time of
the initial transaction and thus prevail over intervening interest
holders just as if recordation had been effected at the time of the
initial transaction.3 These "relation back" laws were recognized
70.59, 70.62A [7.4], at 686, 726 (14th ed. 1978).
27. See 4B COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
Section 2-326 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides in part:
(2) . . . [Gloods held on sale or return are subject to such claims [of the buyer's
creditors] while in the buyer's possession.
(3) . . . The provisions of this subsection are applicable even though an agreement
purports to reserve title to the person making delivery until payment or resale or uses
such words as "on consignment" or "on memorandum". However, this subsection is
not applicable if the person making delivery
(a) complies with an applicable law providing for a consignor's interest or the
like to be evidenced by a sign, or
(b) establishes that the person conducting the business is generally known by
his creditors to be substantially engaged in selling the goods of others, or
(c) complies with the filing provisions of the Article on Secured Transactions
(Article 9).
Id. § 2-326 (1972 version).
70.55, at 647 (14th ed. 1978). Texas' recording act
28. 4B COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
protects subsequent judicial lien creditors. See Cooper Grocery Store v. Park, 218 F. 42, 4344 (5th Cir. 1914); McDonald v. Powell Lumber Co., 243 S.W.2d 192, 195 (Tex. Civ. App.Beaumont 1951, writ ref'd); cf. In re Bessie Himmelstein, 5 BANKR. CT. DEC. 288, 290 (D. N.J.
1979) (trustee's strong-arm status prevailed over bank's mortgage mistakenly omitting
description of portion of property). See generally TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6627
(Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
29. See 26 U.S.C. § 6323(a) (1970).
70.61, at 689-90 (14th ed. 1978). In Texas, for
30. See 4B COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
example, gifts of tangible personal property not accompanied by possession nor evidenced by
recorded deed or a probated will and fictitious loans of personal property are viewed as
fraudulent transfers. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 24.04 - .05 (Vernon 1968). But cf.
In re Ludlum Enterprises, Inc., 510 F.2d 996, 1002 (5th Cir. 1975) (Florida statute voiding
fraudulent transfers held not applicable to lease of tangible personal property).
31. 4B COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 70.51, at 619 (14th ed. 1978); see, e.g., TEX. REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN. arts. 5459, § 2 (relation back of mechanic's and materialman's liens), 5476a
(relation back of certain liens on oil and mineral property) (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979); TEX.
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by the Act 2 and remain effective under the Code.n Thus, a lien
based upon a transaction occurring prior to bankruptcy, but timely
perfected after bankruptcy, may acquire superiority over the
trustee's judicial lien status.
Under both the Act and the Code, the strong-arm rights and
powers of the trustee are not dependent upon the bankruptcy court's
actual or constructive possession of the property in issue except to
the extent that possession by an adverse claimant prior to the institution of the proceedings might constitute perfection under applicable state law.3 In addition, under the Act, the issue of possession
may be relevant in determining whether the trustee can proceed
summarily in the bankruptcy court to avoid the transaction or must
institute plenary proceedings. 5 Inasmuch as the distinction between summary and plenary jurisdiction is not carried forward in
3
the Code, that issue is mooted. 1

II.

TRUSTEE AS A BONA FIDE PURCHASER OF REAL PROPERTY

Under the Act

The trustee is not entitled to the rights and powers of a bona fide
purchaser or encumbrancer for value 37 unless the applicable state
law confers such rights on a judicial lien creditor. 3 Consequently,
under the Act, when the bankrupt holds property impressed with an
express, implied or constructive trust, the strong-arm clause has
usually proved ineffective in avoiding the equitable title or interests
of the beneficiaries.39 In addition, the trustee cannot cut off equities
Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.302(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1978) (relation back of purchase money security interests under U.C.C.).
32. See Bankruptcy Act § 67c(1)(B) (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. §
107(c)(1)(B)).
33. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 546(b) (West Supp. 1979).
34. See 4B COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 70.55, at 645-50 (14th ed. 1978); 77 AM. Jua. 2d,
Vendor and Purchaser, § 671, at 779 (1975) (possession of real estate); U.C.C. § 9-305 (1968
version) (possession of collateral).
35. See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 23.04, at 453-55 (14th ed. 1976).
36. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1471(b), (c) (West Supp. 1979) (granting of jurisdiction).
37. See, e.g., Carroll v. Holliman, 336 F.2d 425, 429-30 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380
U.S. 907 (1965); Commercial Credit Co. v. Davidson, 112 F.2d 54, 56 (5th Cir. 1940); 4B
70.52, at 628-33 (14th ed. 1978). See generally Bankruptcy Act
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
§ 70c (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. § 110(c)) (defenses available to
trustee).
38. See American Soda Fountain Co. v. Parsons, 32 F.2d 737, 738 (1st Cir. 1929) (applying Massachusetts law).
39. 4B COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY $ 70.62, at 695 (14th ed. 1978).
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such as reformation or rescission which are created by mutual mis-

take, fraud or other similar situations. 4°
Under the Code

Section 544(a)(3) expands the trustee's strong-arm powers by
granting him additional status of a hypothetical "bona fide purchaser of real property from the debtor, against whom applicable
law permits such transfer to be perfected" who obtains that status
at the commencement of the case. 4 No similar provision was contained in either the Commission's bill42 or the Judge's bill.4" Little
is said about the provision in the legislative history except that it is
new and that under the bona fide purchaser test a transferee should
not be required "to perfect a transfer against an entity with respect
'4
to which applicable law does not permit perfection."
The extent of the rights, remedies and powers of the trustee as
such a bona fide purchaser are again measured by the substantive
law of the state in which the real property is situated. 5 Therefore,
where the trustee seeks to avoid unrecorded or undisclosed interests
in real property by the use of his bona fide purchaser status, the
following two issues are presented: (1) under the applicable state
law, are the rights of such a bona fide purchaser superior to the
rights of the interest holder, and (2) under applicable state law, can
the transfer sought to be avoided be perfected against a bona fide
purchaser?
The first issue is probably the easiest to answer for in most instances a bona fide purchaser takes title free from legal or equitable
claims of which he has no actual or constructive notice. The second
question is far more difficult to answer. Practically every interest in
40. Id. 70.62, at 695.
41. 11 U.S.C.A. § 544(a)(3) (West Supp. 1979). The Code does not contain a definition
of a "bona fide purchaser" as did both the Commission's bill and the Judges' bill. See H.R.
31, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1-102(8) (1975); H.R. 32, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1-102(c) (1975).
42. See H.R. 31, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4-604(a) (1975).
43. See H.R. 32, 94th Cong., 1st Seass. § 4-604(a) (1975).
44. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Seass. 85, reprinted in [19781 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 5787, 5871; H.R. REP. No.. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Seass. 370, reprinted in [1978] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6326.
45. See Sunderland v. United States, 266 U.S. 226, 233 (1924); Cummings v. Bullock,
367 F.2d 182, 183 (9th Cir. 1966).
46. See Carter v. Converse, 550 S.W.2d 322, 329 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1977, writ refd
n.r.e.); Socony Mobil Oil Corp. v. Belveal, 430 S.W.2d 529, 535 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1968, writ refd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 825 (1969).
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or right relating to real property, legal or equitable, can be perfected
as against a subsequent bona fide purchaser (1) either by recordation or possession where the interest is created by instrument,47 or
(2) by possession or the institution of legal or equitable proceedings
and the filing of an appropriate notice of lis pendens, 5 where it is
created by operation of law."
The most obvious impact of the trustee's new status will be in
those states where the recording act protects subsequent bona fide
purchasers, but not judicial lien creditors. Thus, unrecorded real
estate transfers, by way of grant or security, previously good against
the trustee as a hypothetical judicial lien creditor 0 will now be
voidable by the trustee as a hypothetical bona fide purchaser. Equitable interests of beneficiaries under unperfected express or implied
trusts, resulting trusts and constructive trusts will also fall before
the attack of the trustee as a bona fide purchaser.' In addition, the
trustee will cut off equities created by mutual mistake, fraud, or
similar situations for which equitable relief is afforded by state
law.5" This new strong-arm status may well be the coupe de grace
in bankruptcy proceedings to all non-possessory equitable interests
in real property which are not disclosed in a written instrument
properly recorded prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy
proceedings.
47. See 77 AM. JUR. 2d, Vendor and Purchaser, §
Vendor and Purchaser, § 765, at 295 (1964); Annots, 79
1505, 1529 (1933); 74 A.L.R. 353, 356 (1931); 44 A.L.R.
48. See materials cited at note 47 supra.
49. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 6640, 6641, 6643
§§ 21, 22 (1970).

671, at 779 (1977); 59 TEx. JUR. 2d,
A.L.R.2d 1204, § 9 (1961); 87 A.L.R.
78, 100 (1926).
(Vernon 1959); 51 AM. JUR. 2d, Liens

50. See In re Clifford, 566 F.2d 1023, 1025-27 (5th Cir. 1978); 4B

COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY

70.55, at 646 (14th ed. 1978).
51. Cf. Realty Trust Co. v. Craddock, 112 S.W.2d 440, 442 (Tex. 1938) (rights of bona
fide purchaser held superior to equitable rights of beneficiary under trust). But see 11
U.S.C.A. § 541(d) (West Supp. 1979). The effect, if any, this provision will have on the
trustee's avoiding powers as a bona fide purchaser is unclear.
52. See Landry v. Williamson, 335 S.W.2d 400, 404 (Tex. Civ. App-Houston 1960, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Mineral Holdings Trust v. Stovall, 288 S.W.2d 849, 852 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Galveston), rev'd sub nom. Aluminum Co. of America v. Mineral Holding Trust, 157
Tex. 54, 64, 299 S.W.2d 279, 286 (1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 814 (1957) (all equities);
Carothers v. Mills, 233 S.W. 155, 158 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1921, no writ) (reformation of
a deed); Swann v. Mills, 219 S.W. 850, 852 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1920, writ dism'd
w.o.j.) (reformation of a deed); Dowdy v. Furtner, 198 S.W. 647, 650 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1917, no writ) (homestead claim); Lynn v. Sims, 43 S.W. 554, 556 (Tex. Civ. App.
1897, no writ).
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TRUSTEE AS SUCCESSOR TO ACTUAL CREDITORS

Under the Act
Section 70e of the Act confers upon the trustee the power to avoid
transfers made and obligations incurred by the debtor that are voidable for any reason under any applicable federal or state law 3 by
any creditor having a claim provable under the Act,5" including a
secured claim." The provision reaches out and gathers in for the
trustee all the powers of avoidance available to the actual creditor
and, with one exception, confers upon the trustee no greater rights
of avoidance than the creditor himself would have if he were asserting invalidity on his own behalf. 5 The exception, which is a significant one, is that once the right of avoidance is established, the
extent of the trustee's recovery is not measured by the size of the
claims on the creditor whose rights and powers he asserted. 7 The
trustee sets aside such a transaction entirely for the benefit of all
creditors including those who themselves could not have avoided the
transaction." Thus, a $10.00 claim of a qualified creditor can be

used to invalidate in toto a transfer of property having a value of
$1,000,000.00 which was completely valid with respect to all of the
debtor's other creditors. 9
53. For the purpose of simplicity, the following discussion may at times be in terms of
state law. For examples of transactions voidable under applicable federal law, see, e.g., In re
Leasing Consultants, Inc., 5 BANKR. CT. DEC. 34, 39 (2d Cir. 1979) (payments made to
Congressmen in violation of federal conflict of interests statutes); In re Associated Underwriters, Inc., 5 BANKR. CT. Dec. 9, 10 (D. Utah 1978) (transfer of subordinated securities in
violation of federal law); Benner v. Scandinavian Am. Bank, 131 P. 1149, 1152 (Wash. 1913)
(mortgage of registered vessel not properly recorded at places required by federal law).
54. See Bankruptcy Act § 70e (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. § 110(e)).
55. See, e.g., 4B COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 70.90, at 1035 (14th ed. 1978); Countryman,
The Use of State Law in Bankruptcy Cases (PartII), 47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 631, 657-61 (1972);
Kennedy, The Trustee in Bankruptcy as a Secured Creditor Under the Uniform Commercial
Code, 65 MICH. L. REV. 1419, 1428-29 (1967). See generally Bankruptcy Act § 70e (repealed
1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. § 110(e)).
56. See H.R. REP. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1937).
57. See Moore v. Bay, 284 U.S. 4, 5 (1931); 4B COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 70.95, at 1110
(14th ed. 1978). The Bankruptcy Commission's recommendation that the doctrine of Moore
v. Bay be overruled was rejected, and the doctrine continues to apply. See REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 137, Pt. I, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 200 (1973).
58. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 85, reprinted in 11978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5871; H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 370, reprinted in
[19781 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6326; REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 137, Pt. I, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 200 (1973).
59. See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY
Doc. No. 137, Pt. I, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1973).
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Whenever the trustee seeks to avoid a transfer by stepping into
the shoes of an actual creditor, the following two key issues are
presented: (1) is the transfer fraudulent or voidable for any reason
by a creditor under applicable state law, and (2) is that creditor's
claim provable under the Act? The first issue is to be answered by
referring to the applicable state law and the trustee is subject to all
of the defenses which the transferee could have asserted against
such creditor. 0 For instance, if the creditor's claim was barred by
limitations prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy proceeding, then the trustee's claim is likewise barred.' The second issue
is answered by referring to section 63 of the Act which specifies nine
categories of debts which may be proven.2
If the transaction is avoided, the trustee can recover the property
or collect its value from whomever may hold or may have received
it except a person as to whom the transfer is valid under applicable
3
federal or state laws.
It should be noted that the trustee is not given any cause of action
in favor of any creditor, the creditors as a class, or some portions of
the creditors as a class which is not related to specific property. 4
Under the Code
These omnibus avoiding rights and powers are carried forward in
60. See 4B COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY I 70.71, 70.90, at 787, 789, 1037-38 (14th ed. 1978).
61. See id. at 799-800.
62. See Bankruptcy Act § 63a (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. § 103(a)).
The nine categories of provable debts are:
(1) a fixed liability, as evidenced by a judgment or an instrument in writing, absolutely
owing at the time of the filing of the petition . . . ; (2) costs taxable against a bankrupt
who was at the time of the filing of the petition by or against him plaintiff in a cause
of action which would pass to the trustee and which the trustee declines to prosecute
after notice; (3) a claim for taxable costs incurred in good faith by a creditor before
the filing of the petition in an action to recover a provable debt; (4) an open account,
or a contract express or implied; (5) provable debts reduced to judgments after the
filing of the petition and before the consideration of the bankrupt's applicat ion for a
discharge . . . ; (6) an award of an industrial-accident commission, body, or officer of
any State having jurisdiction to make awards of workmen's compensation... if...
injury occurred prior to adjudication; (7) the right to recover damages in any action
for negligence instituted prior to and pending at the time of the filing of the petition
in bankruptcy; (8) contingent debts and contingent contractual liabilities; or (9)
claims for anticipatory breach of contracts . ...
Id. § 63a (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. § 103(a)).
63. Id. § 70e(2) (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. § 110(e)(2)).
64. Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co., 406 U.S. 416, 434 (1972); see H.R. REP.
No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 179, reprinted in 11978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5963,
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section 544(b) of the Code 5 with the following two changes or clarifications: (1) the claim of the creditor relied upon must be unsecured,6 and (2) the class of claims upon which the trustee can rely
has been expanded from "provable" claims to all "allowable"
claims 7 and certain non-allowable claims for reimbursement or contribution." Therefore, the two key issues presented with reference
to the trustee's avoiding power under the Code are: (1) is the transfer fraudulent or voidable for any reason by an unsecured creditor
of the debtor under applicable state law, and (2) is that creditor's
claim allowable under the Code?
The first issue is to be answered by referring to applicable state
law and the second by referring to the definition of claim set out in
section 101(4)9 and the allowance provisions of section 50210 of the
Code. Since the provisions of the Act and the Code are similar,
the court decisions construing and applying these provisions of

the Act, for the most part, will continue to be relevant. The following are examples of transactions which have been and will
continue to be avoidable by the trustee as successor to actual
creditors: state law fraudulent transfers;7' state law preferential
6140. The following provision was supported by both the Judges and the Commission but
deleted from the enacted Code:
(2) CREDITORS' CLAIMS. - The trustee may, when in the best interest of the
estate, enforce any claim which any class of creditors has against any person and if
necessary for that purpose, the court may stay any other pending action on such
claims. If the trustee brings an action on such a claim, he shall give notice to 'all
creditors who could have brought an action on the claim if the turstee had not done
so. Any judgment entered for or against the trustee on such claim shall be binding on
all such creditors and any recovery by the trustee shall be for the benefit only of such
creditors after the deduction of all expenses incurred by the trustee in effecting such
discovery.
H.R. 31, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4-604(b)(2) (1975); H.R. 32, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4604(b)(2) (1975).
65. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 544(b) (West Supp. 1979).
66. See id. § 544(b).
67. Compare Bankruptcy Act 63a (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. §
103(a)) with 11 U.S.C.A. § 502(b) (West Supp. 1979).
68. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 502(e) (West Supp. 1979).
69. See id. § 101(4). "Claim" is defined as "(A) right to payment ... or (B) right to an
equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment
.... "Id. § 101(4).
70. See id. § 502(e). As mentioned, the Bankruptcy Act recognized only those debts that
can be proved according to the terms of given categories. See Bankruptcy Act 63a (repealed
1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. § 103(a)). On the other hand, all claims are allowed
by the Code, except to the extent they fall under given categories such as unmatured interest.
See 11 U.S.C.A. § 502(e) (West Supp. 1979).
71. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 24.01-.05 (Vernon 1968); 4B COLLIER ON
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transfers;" bulk transfers were the required notices are not given;73
liens whose recordation was intentionally delayed for the purpose of
creating, bolstering or preserving false credit unjustified by the actual financial status of the debtor;" and, certain corporate transactions voidable by creditors. 5
It now appears clear that a delayed perfection, absent fraud, of a
Uniform Commercial Code security interest is not subject to attack
by the trustee as successor to actual creditors; for after perfection,
the security interest is valid and superior to the rights of prior unsecured creditors. This would likewise appear to be true in the case
of consignments where filing or posting was delayed, but accomplished prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy proceeding. "
70.71, at 778 (14th ed. 1978).
72. See, e.g., Burroughs v. Fields, 546 F.2d 215, 218 (7th Cir. 1976); 4B COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY
70.88, at 1020-21 (14th ed. 1978); Countryman, The Use of State Law in
Bankruptcy Cases (Part II), 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 631, 661 (1972).
73. 4B COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 70.74, at 818 (14th ed. 1978). To be avoided by the
trustee, the transfer must be "voidable" under applicable state or federal law. The Uniform
Commercial Code provides that a non-complying bulk transfer is "ineffective against"
creditors. As far as the remedy is concerned, "ineffective" is the same as "voidable." See id.
70.74, at 834 (14th ed. 1978). See generally U.C.C. § 6-104 (1968 version). Would the term
"subordinated" have the same effect? See Countryman, The Use of State Law in Bankruptcy
Cases (Part II), 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 631, 660 (1972).
74. See, e.g., In re Gill, 92 F.2d 810, 811 (5th Cir. 1937); In re Farm & Home Co., 84
F.2d 933,-935 (6th Cir. 1936); 4B COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 70.73, at 814 (14th ed. 1978).
75. See Burroughs v. Fields, 546 F.2d 215, 218 (7th Cir. 1976) (preferential payments to
corporation's president fraudulent under state law); In re Kettle Fried Chicken of America,
Inc., 513 F.2d 807, 813 (6th Cir. 1975) (corporation's repurchase of stock when capital impaired); In re Leasing Consultants, Inc., 5 BANKR. CT. DEC. 34, 39 (1979) (payments made
to U.S. Congressman in violation of federal conflict-of-interests statutes); In re Associated
Underwriters, Inc., 5 BANKR. CT. DEC. 9, 10 (D. Utah 1978) (transfer of subordinated securities
in violation of federal law); In re Modem Engineering & Tool Co., 4 BANKR. CT. DEC. 713,
719 (D. Conn. 1978) (corporation's repurchase of stock while insolvent). But see Palmer v.
Justice, 451 F.2d 371, 371 (5th Cir. 1971) (upholding corporation's repurchase of stock when
done to compromise a debt).
76. Consignments are generally treated the same as security interests under the Uniform
Commercial Code. See U.C.C. § 9-114 (1972 version). For an opposing view, see 4B COLLIER
ON BANKRUPTCY
70.87A, at 1018 (14th ed. 1978). The author states:
The word creditor is defined in the Uniform Commercial Code as including unsecured
creditors. Thus, the noncompliance renders the consignor's title subject to the claims
of the buyer's unsecured creditors and this would certainly appear to include creditors
whose claims arise before there is compliance with the listed alternatives. If any such
creditor has a provable claim in the bankruptcy proceeding, the trustee may stand in
his shoes, by virtue of § 70e; and hold the goods free of the consignor's interest. It would
not matter, apparently, that the consignor may have filed a financing statement before
the bankruptcy petition was filed. As long as there existed any period of time during
which there was a creditor who could have prevailed over the consignor, and that
creditor has a provable claim at the date of bankruptcy, the consignor will lose out to
BANKRUPTCY
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FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS

Under the Act

Section 67d, constituting a federal codification for bankruptcy
purposes of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act," empowers
the trustee to avoid certain transfers of the debtor's non-exempt
property made within one year prior to the commencement of the
bankruptcy proceeding as being actually or constructively fraudulent as against creditors."8 In addition, section 67d(3) empowers the
trustee to reach transfers made within four months of bankruptcy
for a consideration which enables the debtor to make a preferential
transfer.7" These rights of the trustee are in addition to his rights
under the strong-arm clause and as the successor to the rights of
actual creditors, and, for the most part, are not dependent upon
state law. The working of the section is complex due to the attempt
of its draftsmen to conform its language to the language of the
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act and thereby take advantage
of the developing body of case law construing that Act."
Transfers made and obligations incurred under prescribed conditions are declared fraudulent as to then existing or future creditors
or both. If an actual creditor of the class specified having a claim
provable under the Act exists, the trustee can avoid the transaction
except as to bona fide purchasers, lienors or obligees who have
given present fair equivalent value."' If the consideration given was
less than fair, absent actual fraudulent intent, the transferee may
retain the property as security for repayment.82
the trustee because of § 70e.
70.87A, at 1018.
77. See UNIFORM FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES ACT §§ 1-14 (1978).
78. Bankruptcy Act § 67d (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)).
79. Bankruptcy Act § 67d(3) (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)
(3)) (codified rule of Dean v. Davis, 242 U.S. 438, 440 (1917)).
80. See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R.
Doc. No. 137, Pt. I, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 211 (1973); H.R. Doc. No. 137, Pt. II, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. 176 (1973).
81. Bankruptcy Act § 67d(6) (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)
(6)). When only one such creditor existed at the time of the transfer but was paid before
bankruptcy, is the transfer voidable by the trustee? See generally 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
67.34, at 521-22 (14th ed. 1978). When the trustee can avoid the transfer, because it was
fraudulent toward one class of qualified creditor, the extent of his recovery is not limited to
the amount of such creditor's claims. The recovery inures to the benefit of all general creditors
having allowable claims in the proceeding. See Moore v. Bay, 284 U.S. 4, 5 (1931).
82. Bankruptcy Act § 67d(6) (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)
Id.
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The following transfers and obligations are condemned as fraudulent as to specified classes of creditors:
(1) Those made or incurred within one year prior to the
commencement of the bankruptcy proceeding:
(a) without fair consideration at a time when:
(i) the debtor was insolvent or thereby rendered insolvent (fraudulent as to then existing creditors);83
(ii) the debtor was engaged or about to engage in a
business or transaction for which his remaining property is an unreasonably small capital (fraudulent as
to then existing creditors and those who became creditors during the continuance of the business or transaction) ;"4 or
(iii) the debtor intended to incur, or believed that
he would incur debts beyond his ability to pay as they
mature (fraudulent as to then existing and future
creditors) ; and
(iv) in partnership cases, when the partnership is
insolvent, if made or incurred (a) to a partner, or (b)
to a person not a partner without fair consideration
to the partnership (fraudulent as to then existing and
future partnership creditors).s
(b) with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud existing or future creditors (fraudulent as to then existing and
future creditors)."
(2) Those made or incurred within four months prior to the
commencement of the bankruptcy proceedings:
(a) in contemplation of the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings or liquidation of all or a greater portion of the
debtor's property;
(b) with intent to use the consideration obtained to
83. Id. § 67d(2)(a) (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(2) (a)).
84. Id. § 67d(2)(b) (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(2)(b)).
85. Id. § 67d(2)(c) (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(2)(c)). That
the debtor intended to incur a particular debt need not be shown; a general intention will
suffice. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 67.36, at 527 (14th ed. 1978).
86. Bankruptcy Act § 67d(4) (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)
(4)).
87. Id. § 67d(2)(d) (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(2)(d)).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

15

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 11 [2022], No. 2, Art. 3

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 11:311

make a preferential transfer to any creditor; and
(c) the transferee or obligee knew or believed that the
debtor intended to make such use of such consideration
(fraudulent as against then existing and future creditors)."
A transfer is deemed made when perfected against a bona fide
purchaser unless not so perfected at the time of the commencement
of the bankruptcy proceeding, in which case it is deemed made
immediately prior thereto."5 It is at this point in time, rather than
when the transfer actually occurred, that the one year or four
months period begins to run,90 and the validity of the transfer is to
be tested.9 1
In determining the debtor's insolvency, the balance sheet test is
and the assets are taken at
used, exempt property is excluded,
"present fair salable value." 2 Thus, if no current market exists for
the asset or it is temporarily distressed, the asset will be scheduled
at little or no value. 3 Fair consideration includes present value and
antecedent debt that must be a "fair equivalent" of the property
transferred. 4 When the transfer is to secure a debt, the amount of
the debt secured cannot be "disproportionately small" as compared
to the value of the property transferred. 5 Furthermore, to be adjudged fair, the consideration must be given in good faith. This last
requirement has enabled trustees to avoid preferential transfers
made to insiders more than four months but less than one year prior
to the commencement of the bankruptcy proceedings. 7
88. Id. § 67d(3) (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(3)).
89. Id. § 67d(5) (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(5)).
90. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 67.34[3], at 517 (14th ed. 1978). See generally Bankruptcy Act §§ 14c(4), 67a(1), d(2) (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. §§ 32(c)(4),
107(a)(1), (d)(2)).
91. See Kindom Uranium Corp. v. Vance, 269 F.2d 104, 106-07 (10th Cir. 1959); 4
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY

67.40, at 579 (14th ed. 1978). This construction has not been

universally accepted. The Eighth Circuit has declined to apply the test to any element save
the running of the one year period. See Jackson v. Star Sprinkler Corp., 575 F.2d 1223, 1231
(8th Cir. 1978). It appears that the Code adopts the interpretation set out in COLLIER. See
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES,

H.R. Doc. No.

137, Pt. II, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 178 (1973).
92. See Bankruptcy Act § 67d(1)(d) (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. §
107(d)(1)(d)).

93. See 4 COLLIER ON

BANKRUPTCY

67.32, at 501 (14th ed. 1978).

94. See Bankruptcy Act § 67d(1)(e) (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. §
107(d)(1)(e)).
95. See id. § 67d(1)(e) (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(1)(e)).
96. See id. § 67d(1)(e) (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(1)(e)).
97. See, e.g., Burroughs v. Fields, 546 F.2d 215, 218 (7th Cir. 1976); Bullard v. Aluminum
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Under the Code
These fraudulent transfer provisions are for the most part brought
forward in revised form in section 548 of the Code. 8 The language
has been simplified and several substantive changes have been
made. Some of the more significant changes are:
(1) The provisions under which the trustee could avoid transfers made within four months of bankruptcy for a consideration
which enables the debtor to make a preferential transfer are
eliminated."
(2) The voidable transactions are no longer designated as
being fraudulent only with respect to certain creditors. Although creditors must have existed at the time of the transaction in order for the debtor to have been insolvent, there is no
longer any requirement that an actual creditor exist with a
provable or allowable claim. 00
(3) The invalidating rules now apply to exempt as well as
non-exempt property.' 0'
(4) For insolvency purposes, the debtor's property is taken at
a "fair valuation" rather than at "present fair salable value."''0
(5) The fair consideration test has been replaced by a
"reasonably equivalent value" test thereby eliminating the
good-faith requirement. 0 3 Transfers made for full consideration
will be valid even if not made in good faith. The impact of this
change has been lessened because the voidable preference period on transfers to insiders is extended by one year.'0
Co. of America, 468 F.2d 11, 13 (7th Cir. 1972); In re Windor Indus., Inc., 459 F. Supp. 270,
278-79 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
98. See generally 11 U.S.C.A. § 548 (West Supp. 1979).
99. See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R.
Doc. No. 137, Pt. I, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 211-12 (1973). See generally Bankruptcy Act § 67d(3)
(repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C.A. § 107(d)(3)).
100. See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES,
H.R. Doc. No. 137, Pt. II, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 177 (1973).
101. Compare Bankrupty Act § 67d(1)(a) (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11
U.S.C. § 107(d)(1)(a) with 11 U.S.C.A. § 548 (West Supp. 1979). See generally REPORT OF
THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 137, Pt. 11,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. 177 (1973).
102. Compare Bankruptcy Act § 67d(1)(d) (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11
U.S.C. § 107(d)(1)(d)) with 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(26) (West Supp. 1979).
103. Compare Bankruptcy Act § 67d(1)(e) (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11
U.S.C. § 107(d)(1)(e)) with 11 U.S.C.A. § 548(a)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1979).
104. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(b)(4) (West Supp. 1979). See generally id. § 101(25) (defini-

tion of "insider").
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Accordingly, much of the case law developed under section 67d of
the Bankruptcy Act and under the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance
Act will remain relevant.
V.

PREFERENTIAL TRANSFERS

Under the Act
The most frequently invoked of the trustee's avoiding powers is
his power to recover for the benefit of all creditors a pre-bankruptcy
transfer which enables one creditor to recover more on his claim
than other creditors of the same class. This power serves two basic
functions: it deters the "race of diligence" of creditors to dismember
the debtor during his slide into bankruptcy, and facilitates the
prime bankruptcy policy of equality of distribution among creditors. 0.
Under the Act,'"' the trustee can avoid and recover for the benefit
of the bankrupt estate any transfer made:
(1) within four months of the date of the filing of the petition
originally instituting the bankruptcy proceeding;
(2) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
1
(3) on account of an antecedent debt; 07
(4) when the bankrupt was insolvent;
(5) when the creditor, or its agent acting with reference
thereto, had reasonable cause to believe that the bankrupt was
insolvent;0 8
(6) which has the effect of allowing the creditor to obtain a
greater percentage of his debt than some other creditor of the
same class;0 9 and
(7) which results in a diminution of the bankrupt estate available to such creditors." 0
105. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 177-78, reprinted in 11978] U.S.
CONG.

& AD. NEWS 5963, 6138;

CODE

REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE

H.R. Doc, No. 137, Pt. I, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 202 (1973); 3 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY 60.01, at 743-44 (14th ed. 1977).
106. Bankruptcy Act § 60a, b (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. § 96(a),
(b)).
107. Antecedent means pre-existing at the time of the transfer. In National City Bank
v. Hotchkiss, the Supreme Court held that security given before 3:00 P.M. for money borrowed at 10:00 A.M. to buy stock which would be used to obtain cash elsewhere on the same
day, thus supplying funds for repayment before 3:00 P.M. was a voidable preference. National
City Bank v. Hotchkiss, 231 U.S. 50, 59 (1913).
108. Bankruptcy Act § 60b (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. § 96(b)).
109. Id. § 60a(1) (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(1)).
110. See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 60.20, at 859-60 (14th ed. 1977).
UNITED STATES,
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For the purposes of this avoiding power, a transfer of real property
is deemed to have been made when perfected against a bona fide
purchaser and a transfer of personal property is deemed made when
perfected against a judicial lien creditor."' A transfer not so perfected prior to the filing of the petition initiating the bankruptcy
proceedings is deemed to have been made immediately prior
thereto."' It is at this point in time that all of the elements of a
voidable preference must be shown to have been present," 3 and the
trustee has the burden of proof on all elements."'
The issue of the debtor's insolvency is determined by the use of a
balance sheet test in which the fair value of the debtor's exempt
property is included as an asset even though it is not available to
his creditors." 5 A creditor has "reasonable cause to believe" his
debtor is insolvent when such a state of facts is brought to his notice
respecting the affairs and pecuniary condition of his debtor as would
lead a prudent business person to the conclusion that the debtor is
insolvent." 6 While mere suspicion will not suffice, actual knowledge
of or belief in the debtor's insolvency is not required." 7 The element
that the transfer had the effect of enabling the preferred creditor to
receive a greater percentage of this debt than some other creditor
of the same class is established by a showing that there will not be
sufficient funds in the bankrupt estate to pay such creditor in full."'
If the elements of a voidable preference are established, the
trustee is entitled to recover the property,"' or if it has been converted, its value, from any person who has received or converted it
except a bona fide purchaser from or lienor of the initial transferee
for "present fair equivalent value.""12 When less than such value
111. Bankruptcy Act § 60a(2) (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)

(2)).
112.
113.
(2)). See
114.
115.

Id. § 60a(2) (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(2)).
See id. § 60a(1), (2) (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(1),
generally 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 60.56, at 1089-91 (14th ed. 1977).
3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
60.62, at 1123 (14th ed. 1977).
Bankruptcy Act § 1(19) (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. § 1 (19)).

See generally 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUVPTCY 1.19, at 110-11 (14th ed. 1976).
116. See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 60.53[1], at 1057-58 (14th ed. 1977). When circumstances are such that a man of ordinary prudence would inquire, the creditor is charged with
notice of those facts that would be disclosed by a reasonably diligent inquiry. See id.
60.53[1], at 1063.
117. See id. 60.53[1], at 1063.
118. See Palmer Clay Prods. Co. v. Brown, 297 U.S. 227, 229 (1936).
119. See Bankruptcy Act § 60b (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. § 96
(b)).
120. See id.
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was given, the purchaser or lienor is granted a lien upon the property to the extent of the consideration he actually gave.1 ' Additionally, if the preferred creditor, after receiving the preferential
transfer, in good faith gives the debtor further unsecured credit
for property which becomes a part of the debtor's estate, the "net
result rule" is applied and the unpaid amount of such new credit is
set off against the amount which the trustee otherwise would have
been entitled to recover.'2
Most of the elements of a voidable preference are reasonably susceptible to proof with the exception of the debtor's insolvency and
the creditor's state of mind. In many cases the bankrupt's books and
records are in a state of disarray, incomplete, and list non-liquid
assets at other than fair value. While the creditor might be willing
to concede some knowledge that the debtor was experiencing "cash
flow" problems or not paying his debts as they matured, rarely will
the creditor admit that he knew or had reason to believe that the
debtor's liabilities exceeded the fair value of his assets. Unless the
transferee was an insider, in the absence of direct evidence that the
creditor was actually informed of the debtor's insolvency prior to or
at the time of the transfer, the requirement that13 the trustee prove
his state of mind is practically insurmountable.
The problems of proof relating to these two elements and the
adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code which permits floating
security interests in after-acquired property to be perfected by the
filing of a financing statement long before the goods even come into
existence or the debtor acquires any rights in them have greatly
diminished the effectiveness of the trustee's powers to avoid prefer24
ential transfers under the Act.1
Under the Code
To effectuate the goals of the preference provisions more fully,
promote clarity, avoid unessential litigation, and effect coordination
with the Uniform Commercial Code, in 1973 the Commission on the
Bankruptcy Laws of the United States recommended a wholesale
121. Id.
122. Id. § 60c (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. § 96(c)).
123. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 178-79, reprinted in [19781 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6139.

124. See id. at 178-79, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6139;
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES,

H.R. Doc. No.

137, Pt. I, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 203 (1973).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol11/iss2/3

20

Teofan and Creel: The Trustee's Avoiding Powers under the Bankruptcy Act and the Ne

19791

TRUSTEE'S AVOIDING POWERS

revision of the preference provisions of the Act.'2 5 This has been done
in section 547.12 The trustee's burden has been substantially lightened and certain transfers whose avoidability are not within the
policy reasons for the provisions are excepted from attack.
Except for the excepted transactions,' 27 the trustee can avoid and
recover for the benefit of the estate any transfer of the debtor's
property made:
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the
debtor;
(3) when the debtor was insolvent;
(4) within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition
or within one year thereof if made to an insider who had reasonable cause to believe the debtor was insolvent; and
(5) which enables the creditor to receive more than he would
have received if the transfer had not been made and distribution to creditors made in a straight liquidating bankruptcy
28
proceeding.
The two major obstacles to the trustee's recovery under the provisions of the Act, if not totally removed, have been substantially
diminished. The trustee is armed With a presumption that the
debtor was insolvent during the 90 days immediately preceding the
filing of the petition. 29 Exempt assets are no longer included on the
asset side of the balance sheet. 1 ° While the trustee still must prove
that an insider who received a preference outside the 90-day period
but within the one year period had reasonable cause to believe his
debtor was insolvent,'' an insider may often be charged with knowl32
edge of the debtor's financial condition, as a matter of law.
125. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 179, reprinted in 11978] U.S. CODE
5963, 6139-40; REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF
THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 137, Pt. II, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 169 (1973).
126. See generally 11 U.S.C.A. § 547 (West Supp. 1979).
127. See id. § 547(c).
128. See id. § 547(b). Thus, the court must focus on the allowance and priority of the
claim preferred. If the claim would have been entirely disallowed, the test will be met. If the
claim is allowable as a fifth priority tax claim, and in liquidation, the creditor holding fourth
priority would not be paid in full, the test is likewise met. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 372, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6328.
129. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(f) (West Supp. 1979).
130. See id. § 101(26) (definition of "insolvent").
131. Id. § 547(b)(4)(B)).
CONG. & AD. NEWS

132. See 3 COLLIER

ON BANKRUPTCY

60.53, at 1061 n.2 (14th ed. 1977).
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The time that the transfer is deemed to have been made and,
therefore, its validity is to be tested, remains substantially the same
as it is under the Act 33 except that: (1) the transferee is given a tenday grace period from the actual date of the transfer within which
to perfect the transfer,' 34 and (2) the transfer cannot be made until
the debtor has acquired rights in the property transferred.' 35 This
latter provision prevents the perfection, as against the trustee, of a
security interest in after-acquired property from relating back to the
3
date of the filing of the financing statement.'
Preferential transfers of the debtor's exempt property 3 7 can now
be recovered by the trustee as can preferential transfers to the tax
38
collector including the Internal Revenue Service.'
Six categories of transfers are placed beyond the trustee's reach.13

If the creditor can qualify under any one or more of these exemptions, he is protected by each to the extent of his qualification.11
Included in the six categories are:
(1) transfers intended as, and which substantially are, contemporaneous exchanges for new value;"'
(2) transfers in payment of a debt incurred and paid in the
133. Compare Bankruptcy Act § 60a(1), (2) (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11
U.S.C. § 96(a)(1), (2)) with 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(e)(2), (3) (West Supp. 1979).
134. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(e)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1979).
135. See id. § 547(e)(3).
136. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 374, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 5963, 6330. This provision, more than any other in the section, overrules DuBay
and GrainMerchants, and in combination with subsection (b)(2), overrules In re King-Porter
Co., 446 F.2d 722 (5th Cir. 1971). Id. at 374.
137. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R.
Doc. No. 137, Pt. I, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 204 (1973).
138. This is the result of the combined effect of sections 106(c), 547(b)(5) and 507(a)(6)
of the Code. See 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 106(c), 507(a)(6), 547(b)(5) (West Supp. 1979). "As provided,
section 106(c) of the House amendment overrules contrary language in the House report with
the result that the Government is subject to avoidance of preferential transfers." 124 CONG.
REC. H11089 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (statement of Hon. Don Edwards).
139. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(c) (West Supp. 1979).
140. See S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 88, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 5787, 5874; H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 373, reprinted in [1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6329.

141. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(c)(1) (West Supp. 1979). Under this provision, a check is "intended to be contemporaneous" and if presented for payment in the ordinary course of affairs,
which the Uniform Commercial Code specifies as thirty days, it will be protected. Id. §
547(c)(1); H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 373, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 5963, 6329. See generally U.C.C. § 3-503(2) (1968 version). This exception will
not apply if the check is dishonored. See 124 CONG. REC. H11089 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978)
(statement of Hon. Don Edwards).
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ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and
the transferee according to ordinary business terms not later
than 45 days after the debt was incurred;'42
(3) a transfer of a security interest in property acquired by the
debtor to the extent that the security interest secures new value
given by or on behalf of the secured party to enable the debtor
to acquire such property and it is in fact so used.' The new
value cannot be given prior to the signing of a security agreement containing a description of the property as collateral, and
the security interest must be perfected within ten days after it
attaches;'44
(4) preferential transfers which would otherwise be voidable
to the extent that the creditor thereafter gave new value to or
for the benefit of the debtor. The new value cannot be secured
by an otherwise unavoidable security interest or be for an otherwise unavoidable transfer made to or for the benefit of the
creditor.'45
(5) transfers of a perfected security interest in inventory or a
receivable, or their proceeds to the extent that the creditor's
position is not improved within the applicable preference period. "' To the extent that the creditor's position is improved
142. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(c)(2) (West Supp. 1979); H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
373, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6329.
In the tax context, this exception will mean that a payment of taxes when they are
due, either originally or under an extension, or within 45 days thereafter, will not
constitute a voidable preference. However, if a payment is made later than the last
day on which the tax may be paid without penalty, then the payment may constitute
a preference, if the other elements of a preference are present. In that case, the tax
debt would be an antecedent debt and would not fall under this exception.
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 373, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5963, 6329.
143. If challenged, the lender may be required to trace the funds advanced into the seller
of the property.
144. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(c)(3) (West Supp. 1979). This is to enable the debtor to obtain
such loans to acquire property. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 373, reprinted in
[19781 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6329.
145. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(c)(4) (West Supp. 1979). This codifies the "net result rule" of
Bankruptcy Act § 60 as expressed in In re Hygrade Envelope Corp., 393 F.2d 60, 65 (2nd Cir.),
cert. denied sub nom. Gilbraltor Factors Corp. v. Baranow, 393 U.S. 837 (1968). See
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 374, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5963, 6330.
146. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(c)(5) (West Supp. 1979). This provision overrules cases such as
Dubay v. Williams and Grain Merchants, Inc. v. Union Bank which held that such security
interests were not subject to attack since their perfection related back to the filing of the
financing statements outside such period. See DuBay v. Williams, 417 F.2d 1277, 1285, 1288
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during the preference period, and such improvement prejudices
other unsecured creditors, the trustee can avoid the security
interest.'4 7 A two-point test is provided. The amount by which
the debt secured exceeds the value of the collateral on the date
the petition is filed is subtracted from the amount by which the
debt secured exceeded the value of the collateral at the beginning of the preference period or if no debt then existed, the date
on which new value was first given during the period under the
security agreement creating the security interest. 4 8
(6) the fixing of statutory liens not otherwise avoidable by the
trustee.'49
Inasmuch as the "reasonable cause to believe" requirement has
been eliminated, judicial liens obtained within four months of the
(9th Cir. 1969); Grain Merchants, Inc. v. Union Bank & Sav. Co., 408 F.2d 209, 212 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 827 (1969).
147. As to when other creditors are prejudiced, see REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE
BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. 137, Pt. I, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 209-10
(1973):
Improvement in position is alone not enough. The trustee must also establish that the
improvement was at the expense of the estate. This is intended partially to meet
Professor Kripke's criticism that increases in value of collateral due to, e.g., harvesting
crops, completing work in process, sales of inventory, and seasonal fluctuations in
value, would constitute improvement in position and be recoverable:
In my opinion the creditor should keep the benefit of the improvements in the
cases mentioned, so long as it is not at the expense of other parties interested
in the estate. I think there is a formula for protecting the other parties against
depletion of the estate for the benefit of the secured creditor in this respect. That
formula is found in Meinhard, Greeff & Co. v. Edens, 189 F.2d 792 (4th Cir.
1951) which I cited to Professor Gilmore as a model for this problem on May
31, 1966. The court was there considering the problem of the allocation between
the secured creditor and the estate of the value of goods which had been in
process at the moment of bankruptcy and which had been finished by the
trustee. The court held that the secured creditor was entitled to the entire value
of the finished goods, less the costs expended by the trustee in finishing the
goods. This of course was for operations which occurred after bankruptcy. There
is no reason why the same principle may not be applied to expenditures by the
bankrupt or debts incurred by the bankrupt within the four-month period.
Id. at 209-10 (quoting letter from Prof. Homer Kripke to Gilmore Committee, Sept. 17, 1970).
148. For example: assume a constant debt of $100. If at the beginning of the preference
period, the value of the inventory collateral is $50 and at the time of the filing of the petition
it is $80, the trustee can recover $30 [(100-50) - (100-80) = 30]. If the value of the collateral
at the beginning of the period is $100, then during the period drops to $10 but builds back
up to $150 at the filing of the petition, there would be no recovery since there was no
deficiency at the beginning of the period. See H.R. Doc. No. 137, Pt. I, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
208 (1973). The estate, of course, would own the $50 equity at the time of the petition. See
11 U.S.C.A. § 541(a)(1) (West Supp. 1979).
149. Id. § 547(c)(6).
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filing of the bankruptcy petition previously voidable under section
67a of the Act'50 are now voidable as preferences under the Code as
are transfers to a surety who furnished a bond to dissolve such a
judicial lien."' As before, the surety is discharged of his liability
under the bond to the extent of the value of the property re52
covered.
VI.

SETOFF

Under the Act
Section 68 preserves the long-recognized right of offset'53 and provides that when mutual debts'54 and credits exist between the bankrupt estate and a creditor, one shall be offset against the other and
only the balance allowed.'55 Specifically excepted from the creditor's
claims which can be used for offset purposes are claims which are
not provable debts of the bankrupt, claims of persons who received
voidable transfers and have not surrendered them to the trustee,
and claims acquired from third parties after or within four months
before the filing of the bankruptcy petition with a view toward offset
with knowledge or notice that the bankrupt was insolvent or had
committed an act of bankruptcy.'56 A setoff may be made before or
after the filing of the bankruptcy petition'57 and no court action is
required.
Inasmuch as the act of offset does not constitute a "transfer,"
absent special circumstances, the transaction cannot be set aside by
the trustee.' 8 The offset most commonly encountered in bankruptcy
proceedings is when a bank debits the bankrupt's general checking
account and credits the amount against the bankrupt's indebted150. See Bankruptcy Act § 67a (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. § 107(a)).
151. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(d) (West Supp. 1979).
152. See id. § 547(d).
153. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
68.01, at 843 (14th ed. 1978).
154. The debts or credits must be in the same right and between the same parties,
standing in the same capacity. Id. 68.04, at 867.
155. See Bankruptcy Act § 68a (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. § 108(a)).
156. See id. § 68b (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. § 108(b)).
157. Studley v. Boylston Nat'l Bank, 229 U.S. 523, 526 (1913). This right may be modified or denied if the offset would frustrate rehabilitation of the debtor. See, e.g., Lowden v.
Northwestern Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 298 U.S. 160, 166 (1936); In re Penn Cent. Transp.
Co., 453 F.2d 520, 521-22 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 923 (1972); In re Williams,
422 F. Supp. 342, 345 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
158. Katz v. First Nat'l Bank, 568 F.2d 964, 969 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1069 (1978).
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ness to the bank." 9 The practical effect of this transaction, especially when the balance in the account has substantially increased
during the four months prior to bankruptcy, is to enable the bank
to receive a greater percentage of its claim than other creditors.
Unless the trustee can prove that the debtor "built-up" the account
for the express purpose of permitting the setoff, the trustee has little
chance under the Act of avoiding the setoff and recovering the offset
amounts.' 0 Even then, he must prove all of the elements of a voidable preference.' 6 '
Under the Code
With some additional limitations, the Code continues to recognize the right of a creditor to offset a prepetition mutual debt of the
debtor against a prepetition claim of the creditor.' However, the
creditor's right of offset is now automatically stayed upon the filing
of the bankruptcy petition 3 and is subject to a limited and quali64
fied right of the trustee to use the amount subject to offset.
Under section 553(a), the following claims against the debtor cannot be used to offset the creditor's debt to the debtor:
(1) non-allowable claims; "'
(2) debts owed by the debtor to a third party, acquired by the
offsetting creditor:
(a) after the commencement of the case; or
(b) after 90 days before the filing of the petition; and
6
(c) while the debtor was insolvent;
(3) debts owed by the creditor to the debtor, incurred by the
creditor:
(a) after 90 days before the filing of the petition;
159. The fact that the debtor gave the bank a check on the account subject to offset does
not change this result. See McKee v. Hood, 312 F.2d 394, 397 (5th Cir. 1963).
160. See, e.g., In re PRS Prods., Inc., 574 F.2d 414, 418 (8th Cir. 1978); Katz v. First
Nat'l Bank, 568 F.2d 964, 969 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978); Jensen v.
State Bank, 518 F.2d 1, 4 (8th Cir. 1975).
161. See, e.g., In re PRS Prod. Inc., 574 F.2d 414, 416 (8th Cir. 1978); Katz v. First Nat'l
Bank, 568 F.2d 964, 969 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978); Jensen v. State
Bank, 518 F.2d 1, 4 (8th Cir. 1975).
162. See generally 11 U.S.C.A. § 553 (West Supp. 1979).
163. See id. § 362.
164. See id. § 362.
165. See id. § 553(a)(1). See generally id. § 503(b)(3).
166. Id. § 553(a)(2).
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(b) while the debtor was insolvent; and
(c) in order to obtain a setoff.'7
The debtor is presumed to have been insolvent during the 90-day
period."'5
Section 553(b) creates a new trustee's avoiding power.'" The
trustee may now recover for the benefit of the estate any prepetition setoff occurring within 90 days of the filing of the petition to
the extent that the creditor's position was improved. The trustee's
recovery is measured by subtracting the amount of the creditor's
insufficiency on the setoff date from the amount of the insufficiency
on the 90th day before the filing of the petition or the first day
during the 90-day period on which there was an insufficiency,
whichever occurred later. "Insufficiency" is defined as the amount
by which the claim owed by the debtor exceeds the debt owed to the
debtor."" This test is a simple two-point test similar to that provided for inventory and receivable security interests under the preference section."' However there is no requirement that the debtor
be insolvent at any time during the 90-day period.' 2 Postpetition
setoffs, which can be effected only after the automatic stay has been
lifted, are not subject to this avoiding power.'
VII.

JUDICIAL LIENS

Under the Act

Under section 67a(1), the trustee can avoid any lien obtained
against the bankrupt's non-exempt property by legal or equitable
process such as attachment, garnishment, or levy of execution
within four months prior to the commencement of the case if:
167. Id.§ 553(a)(3).
168. Id. § 553(c).
169. Id.§ 553(b)(1).
170. Id.§ 553(b)(2).
171. See id. § 547(c)(5). See also text accompanying notes 146-148 supra. For example,
assume a constant debt of $100. If at the ninetieth day before filing, the account balance is
$50 and at time of offset is $80, the trustee can recover $30; if at the ninetieth day, the balance
is $150, then falls to $50 on the sixtieth day and at time of offset is $80, the trustee can still
recover $30. To this extent, the test differs from the inventory/receivables test.
172. Section 547(b) contains no such requirement. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(b) (West Supp.
1979).
173. See generally id. §§ 362(a)(7), 549. In part, the purpose of excepting postpetition
setoff is to encourage banks to carry a debtor through the difficult immediate pre-bankruptcy
period. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 184, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWs 5963, 6145.
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(1) the debtor was insolvent at the time the lien was obtained; or
(2) the lien was74sought and permitted in fraud of the provisions of the Act.1

Any transfer of the debtor's non-exempt property by way of grant
or security, given to indemnify a surety who furnished a bond or
other obligation to dissolve such judicial lien is likewise avoidable
by the trustee,'75 and to the extent avoided, the surety's obligation
under the bond is discharged. 76 Bona fide purchasers of the property
are protected, but if they acquired the property at other than a
title is valid only to the
judicial sale held to enforce the lien, their
17
extent of the present consideration paid.
Under the Code

because such
These provisions are not carried forward in the Code
7
liens may now be avoided as preferential transfers. 1
VIII.

STATUTORY LIENS

Under the Act

As a general rule, statutory liens created or recognized by state
or federal law will be valid against the trustee even if perfected
within four months prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy
proceeding while the debtor was insolvent. 179 However, some statutory liens are merely disguised priorities enacted to favor a particular class of creditors at the expense of unsecured creditors and
thereby circumvent the priorities of distribution established by the
Act. Still other statutory liens, such as tax liens, may be so pervasive and all encompassing that their enforcement would produce
inequitable results. 180
To avoid such results, section 67c of the Act, in complex and
174. Bankruptcy Act § 67a(1) (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. §
107(a)(1)).
175. Id. § 67a(2) (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. § 107(a)(2)).
176. Id. § 67a(5) (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. § 107(a)(5)).
177. See id. § 67a(3) (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. § 107(a)(3)).
178. See notes 150-151 supra and accompanying text. See generally 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(b)
(West Supp. 1979).
179. See Bankruptcy Act § 67b (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. §
107(b)).
180. S. REP. No. 277, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1965); H.R. REP. No. 686, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess. 5 (1965); see 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 67.20, at 223-24 (14th ed. 1978).
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confusing terms, renders voidable by the trustee every statutory lien
which:
(1) first becomes effective upon
(a) the insolvency of the debtor, or
(b) upon distribution or liquidation of his property, or
(c) upon execution against his property levied at the instance of someone other than the lienor,'5 ' or
(2) is not perfected or enforceable at the date of bankruptcy
against one acquiring the rights of a hypothetical bona fide
purchaser from the debtor on that date;' 2 or
(3) is for rent or is a lien of distress for rent, whether statutory
3
or not.'
In addition, unless accompanied by possession, tax liens on personal property are subordinated to the payment of costs of administration and priority wage claims.' 4
These avoidance provisions are not applicable: when the lien is
enforced by sale before the commencement of the bankruptcy proceeding; when the property is abandoned by the trustee or not administered in the bankruptcy proceeding; or, in railroad or corporate reorganization proceedings.'
Under the Code
These avoiding provisions, rewritten in vastly improved and
181. See Bankruptcy Act § 67c(1) (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. § 107

(c)(M)).

182. If the lien is not invalid in bankruptcy against the trustee as a judicial lien creditor
and the time for perfection against bona fide purchasers under the applicable lien law has
not expired, the lien may be so perfected after bankruptcy. If the means of perfection is
seizure, it is perfected instead by filing a notice with the bankruptcy court. See id. § 67c(1)(b)
(repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(1)(B)). The language of the section
is confusing and subject to different interpretations. See Countryman, The Use of State Law
In Bankruptcy Cases (PartII), 47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 631, 640-45 (1972); Kennedy, The Bankruptcy Amendments of 1966, 41 REF. J. 1, 7 (1967).
183. See Bankruptcy Act § 67c(1) (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. § 107

(c)(1)).
184. See id. § 67c(3) (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(3)). This
subordination gives rise to some interesting circuity of liens problems when the tax lien is
superior to a contractual lien that is superior to costs of administration and priority wage
claims that are superior to the tax liens, etc. See H.R. REP. No. 686, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
17 (1965); Kennedy, The Bankruptcy Amendments of 1966, 41 REF. J. 1, 9-10 (1967).
185. See Bankruptcy Act § 67c(5) (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. § 107

(c)(5)).
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clearer language, essentially are carried forward into the Code."8 In
condensed form, section 545 empowers the trustee to avoid a statutory lien on the debtor's property insofar as the lien:
(1) first becomes effective against the debtor
(a) when a bankruptcy case is commenced;
(b) when a non-bankruptcy insolvency proceeding is
commenced;
(c) when a custodian is appointed or takes possession of
the property;
(d) when the debtor becomes insolvent;
(e) when the debtor's financial condition fails to meet a
specified standard; or
(f) at the time of a levy of an execution against the property by someone other than the statutory lien claimant;
(2) is not perfected on the date of the filing of the petition
against a hypothetical bona fide purchaser from the debtor on
that date;" 7
(3) is for rent; or
(4) is a lien of distress for rent.
The lien can now be avoided even though it may have been enforced
by sale prior to the commencement of the case.' 8
The subordination of tax liens is continued and expanded by
section 724(b).' 8 1 Tax liens on real property and on personal property
accompanied by possession are not excluded. Property, or its proceeds, subject to a tax lien, or any statutory lien whose priority is
determined in the same manner as a tax lien, is to be distributed
in the following order of priority:
(1) to the holders of liens senior to the tax lien;
(2) to all priority claims, except tax claims, but only to the
extent of the amount of the allowed tax claim secured by the
lien;
(3) to the tax lien claimant to the extent that priority claims
did not use up the amount of his entire claim;
186. See generally 11 U.S.C.A. § 545 (West Supp.
187. Again, if under the applicable lien law a later
the filing of the bankruptcy petition, the subsequent
trustee. See id. § 546(b).
188. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
CONG. & AD. NEws 5963, 6327.
189. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 724(b) (West Supp. 1979).
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to junior lienholders;

(5) to the tax lien claimant to the extent he was not paid
under (3); and
(6) to the debtor's estate.'9 °
These subordination provisions apply only in liquidation proceedings under Chapter 7 of the Code.' 9'
In addition, the trustee in a Chapter 7 liquidation proceeding may
avoid a lien that secures a claim for any fine, penalty, or forfeiture,
or for multiple, exemplary, or punitive damages, that arose before
the earlier of the order for relief or the appointment of a trustee.'9
Avoidance, however, is limited to the extent the claim secured is not
compensation for actual pecuniary loss suffered by the claim
holder.'9 3 If the case is thereafter converted to a Chapter 11 reorganization proceeding, the lien will be revitalized." 4

IX.

POSTPETITION TRANSFERS

Under the Act
The filing of a bankruptcy petition, voluntary or involuntary,
under the Act establishes a date of cleavage after which the debtor's
ability to validly dispose of his non-exempt property is severely
curtailed. It is at this point in time that the title to all of his nonexempt property vests by operation of law in the trustee in bankruptcy upon his appointment and qualification.'9 5 Theoretically, the
debtor thereafter has no title which he can transfer.'" Because the
strict application of this principle would work a hardship on innocent parties who, without knowledge of the pending bankruptcy
proceedings, deal with the debtor on a bona fide basis for a present
consideration, these parties are afforded limited protection.' 7
Thus, the trustee cannot avoid a postpetition transfer of real
190.-Id. § 724(b).
191. See id. § 103(b). These provisions, however, will have an indirect application in
reorganization and individual adjustment cases in determining whether under the plan the
creditor will receive as much as they would have received in a liquidation case. See generally
id. §§ 1129(a)(7), 1325(a)(4).
192. See id. § 724(a).
193. See id. § 726(a)(4).
194. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 382, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6338.
195. See Bankruptcy Act § 70a (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. § 110(a)).
196. See 4A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY

197. See id.

70.04, at 50.1-50.2 (14th ed. 1978).

70.05, at 70 (14th ed. 1978); 4 id.
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property to a bona fide purchaser or lienor for present fair equivalent value who was without actual notice of the pendency of the
proceedings or to a purchaser at a judicial sale unless: (1) the property is situated in the county in which the bankruptcy proceeding
is pending, or (2) a certified copy of the petition with schedules
omitted, of the decree of adjudication, or of the order approving the
trustee's bond was recorded in the real estate records of the county
in which the realty is situated prior to the perfection of the transfer.9' When the consideration is less than a present fair equivalent
value, the bona fide purchaser is given a lien upon the property to
the extent of the value actually given. 9 '
With relation to personal property, the trustee can avoid all postpetition transfers unless they were made to a person acting in good
faith for a present fair equivalent value during the interim period
after the filing of an involuntary petition and before adjudication or
a receiver took possession of the bankrupt's property, whichever
occurred first10 If the transfer was made for less than such value,
the transferee is given a lien upon the property to the extent of the
present value actually paid.20' Also protected are persons indebted
to the bankrupt or holding the bankrupt's property who, during this
interim period between the filing of the involuntary petition and
adjudication or a receiver's taking possession, in good faith pay the
indebtedness or deliver the property to the bankrupt or another
upon his order.20 2 A person having actual knowledge of the pending
bankruptcy proceeding is deemed to have acted not in good faith
unless he had reasonable cause to believe that the bankruptcy petition was not well founded.2 0 3 The party asserting the validity of the
24
transfer is given the burden of proof.
Under the Code
These provisions are carried forward in sections 542(c), 549 and
198. Bankruptcy Act § 21g (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. § 44(g)).
199. Id. § 21g (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. § 44(g)).
200. See id. § 70d(1) (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. § 110(d)(1)).
201. Id. § 70d(1) (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C., § 110(d)(1)).
202. Id. § 70d(2) (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. § 110(d)(2)). This
protection was extended beyond adjudication, at least for banks. See Bank of Marin v.
England, 385 U.S. 99, 103 (1966).
203. Bankruptcy Act § 70d(3) (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. §
110(d)(3)).
204. Id. § 70d(5) (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. § 110(d)(5)).
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550 of the Code with minor substantive modifications. 05 With relation to real estate transfers, the document to be filed in the real
estate records is limited to a copy of the petition.0 6 In situations
involving personal property transfers during the interim period between filing and the entry of an order for relief, the transferee's good
faith and knowledge of the pendency of the proceeding is now immaterial, 10 the burden of proof provision has been omitted and the
transfer is valid to the extent of any postpetition value, including
services given in exchange for such transfer. 0 ' The protection afforded a third party who, in good faith, transfers the debtor's property or pays a debt owing to the debtor after the filing of the petition
has been expanded to cover transfers made after the entry of the
order for relief but before he acquires actual notice or knowledge of
the commencement of the case. 09
X.

LIABILITY OF TRANSFEREES

Under the Act
Seven sections of the Bankruptcy Act partially define the relative
rights of the trustee and initial and subsequent transferees of
avoided transactions. t 0 There are variations depending upon the
nature of the transaction and the avoiding power utilized. These
have been discussed previously in reviewing each of the trustee's
avoiding powers under the Act. As a general rule, the trustee can
recover the property, or its value, from any person who received or
converted it except a bona fide purchaser, lienor or obligee for a
present fair equivalent value. To the extent that such value was not
given, a good-faith transferee is given a lien on the property to the
extent of the consideration actually given, which, in most cases,
need not be a present consideration.
Under the Code
The Code prescribes the liability of and protection granted to
transferees in greater detail than the Act.' Section 550 differen205. See generally 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 542(c), 549, 550 (West Supp. 1979).

206. See id. § 549(c).
207. See id. § 549(b).
208. Id. § 549(b).
209. See id. § 542(c).
210. See generally Bankruptcy Act §§ 21g, 60b, 67a(3), d(6), 70d(1), d(5), e(2) (repealed
1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. §§ 44(g), 96(b), 107(a)(3), (d)(6), 110(d)(1), (d)(5),
(e)(2)).
211. See generally 11 U.S.C.A. § 550 (West Supp. 1979).
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tiates between the concepts of avoiding the transfer and recovering
from the transferee, and related to all transfers avoided under the
Code. To the extent that a transfer is avoided, the trustee may
recover the property, or if the court so orders, the value of such
property from:
(1) the initial transferee or entity for whose benefit the transfer was made; 12 or

(2) any immediate or mediate transferee of the initial trans13
feree except:

(a) a transferee who takes for value, including satisfaction or securing of a present or antecedent debt, in good
faith, and without knowledge of the voidability of the
transfer;'" or
(b) any immediate or mediate good-faith transferee of
such transferee. 15
The requirement of good faith is imposed to prevent a "washing"
of the transaction through an innocent third party.26 The Act's
requirement of present consideration has been eliminated.
Additionally, the Code protects a good-faith transferee of a voidable transfer who thereafter improves the property by granting him
a lien on the property to secure the lesser of (1) the cost of the
improvements made less any profit realized from the property, and
(2) any increase in the value of the property resulting from the
improvement. 7 The definition of improvement includes physical
additions or changes to the property, repairs, payment of taxes on
the property, discharge of any lien on the property equal or superior
to the rights of the trustee, and preservation of the property. 28 The
trustee, of course, is limited to only a single satisfaction on account
of any avoided transfer. 9
212. Id. § 550(a)(1)).
213. Id. § 550(a)(2)).
214. Id. § 550(b)(1)).
215. Id. § 550(b)(2)).
216. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 376, reprinted in [1978] U.S.
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6332.
217. 11 U.S.C.A. § 550(d)(1) (West Supp. 1979).
218. Id. § 550(d)(2).
219. Id. § 550(c).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol11/iss2/3

CODE

34

Teofan and Creel: The Trustee's Avoiding Powers under the Bankruptcy Act and the Ne

TRUSTEE'S AVOIDING POWERS

19791

XI.

PRESERVATION OF AVOIDED TRANSFER

Under the Act
The bankruptcy court may, on due notice, order a transfer or
obligation avoided by the trustee to be preserved for the benefit of
the estate, in which event the trustee succeeds to and may enforce
the rights of the transferee or obligee.2 ° The purpose of this preservation is to prevent junior lienholders from improving their position
22
at the expense of the estate when a senior lien is avoided. '
Under the Code
Any transfer avoided by the trustee is now automatically preserved for the benefit of the estate, but only with respect to property
of the estate.222 The purpose of the qualification is to prevent the
trustee from asserting an avoided tax lien against after-acquired
22 3
property of the debtor.
X1I.

LIMITATION

Under the Act
Section lie of the Act requires that suits brought by the receiver
or trustee in behalf of the bankruptcy estate based upon prebankruptcy transactions must be instituted:
(1) within two years subsequent to the date of adjudication;
or
(2) within such further period of time as the applicable federal or state law may permit;
provided that any applicable period of federal or state law limitation had not expired prior to the, commencement of the bankruptcy
224
proceeding.
When the cause of action asserted by the trustee is created by the
Act such as one to recover a voidable preference under section 6022
220. BANKR. PROC. R. 611.
221. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 91, reprinted in [1978] U.S.

CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 5787, 5877; H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 376, reprintedin [1978] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6332.
222. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 551 (West Supp. 1979).
223. See 124 CONG. REC. H11089 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (statement of Hon. Don
Edwards).
224. See Bankruptcy Act § lle (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. § 29(e)).
225. See id. § 60 (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. § 96).
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or avoid a fraudulent transfer under section 67d,22 1 it is clear that
the two-year limitation applies.227 While it is not as clear, when the
claim is asserted under the trustee's section 70c22 strong-arm powers
or as successor to the rights of actual creditors under section 70e,221
because the extent of those rights are governed by applicable state
or federal non-bankruptcy law it would appear the trustee also has
the benefit of the applicable federal or state limitation period.230
Thus, if the state period of limitation expires after, but within two
years of, the date of adjudication, the trustee would have the benefit
of the two-year period. If, however, the period under applicable
state law expires after the two-year period, the trustee would have
the benefit of the additional time afforded by the state law. In
determining the length of the period of limitations afforded by state
law, reference should also be made to those situations in which the
running of that period would be tolled.23'
The running of the period of time prescribed by section lie is
suspended during the pendency of the case under Chapters X,232
XI,23 X11234 or X111 2 31 of the Act.2 3 For example, if the debtor is

adjudicated a bankrupt upon an involuntary petition filed against
him on September 1, 1979, and one year thereafter, on September
1, 1980, files a Chapter XI arrangement petition in the case which
is then dismissed two years later on September 1, 1982, the trustee
would still have one year within which to file a suit to recover a
voidable preference made before the filing of the involuntary petition .37
Under the Code

Any action by the trustee to avoid prepetition transactions must
be commenced before the earlier of:
226. See id. § 67d (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)).
227. See Herget v. Central Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 324 U.S. 4, 8-9 (1945); 1A COLLIER
ON BANKRUPrCY
11.13[2], at 1214-15 (14th ed. 1978).
228. Bankruptcy Act § 70c (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. § 110(c)).
229. Id. § 70e (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. § 110(e)).
230. See Bannister v. Salamon, 126 F.2d 740, 742-44 (2d Cir. 1942).
231. Id. at 742-44.
232. Bankruptcy Act § 261 (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. § 661).
233. Id. § 391 (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. § 791).
234. Id. § 516 (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. § 916).
235. Id. § 676 (repealed 1978, previously codified as 11 U.S.C. § 1076).
236. 9 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
12.01, at 706 (14th ed. 1978).
237. See id. 12.01, at 706.
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two years after the appointment of a non-interim trustee;
the close or dismissal of the case.23

Any action against a transferee of an avoided transfer must be
commenced before the earlier of:
(1)
(2)

one year after the avoidance of the transfer; or
the close or dismissal of the case. 3 '

Any action to avoid postpetition transfers must be commenced before the earlier of:
(1)
(2)

two years after the transfer; or
the close or dismissal of the case.
XIII.

40

CONCLUSION

The trustee's avoiding powers as renovated by the Code have been
clarified, modernized and strengthened. Many substantial transfers
clearly violative of bankruptcy's fundamental policy of equality of
distribution that were previously unavoidable are now subject to the
trustee's reach. Conversely, transfers previously voidable that were
not violative of such policy are now clearly defined and excepted.
These powers are now synchronized with modern commercial practices. Disabilitating burdens of proof have either been eliminated or
lessened by the benefit of presumptions. These changes, when taken
together with the extinction of the distinction between summary
and plenary jurisdiction, will eliminate much unnecessary litigation
and bring about a faster and fairer distribution of the bankrupt's
property to creditors.
238. i U.S.C.A. § 546(a) (West Supp. 1979).
239. Id. § 550(e).
240. Id. § 549(d).
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